Introduction
often called the world's oldest profession, prostitution has long been regarded as a blight on society, a moral shortcoming on the part of the engaged parties, and a failure of humanity that the practice of selling sexual acts continues to occur. in his book "Defending the Undefendable," Walter Block notes that, despite the fact that selling sex is illegal and has many attached hazards, prostitutes' services are continuously sought out (Block 2008) . Perhaps the crux of the matter is that a transaction which society deems socially repugnant is not necessarily economically inconsistent, but rather is also subject to the same tendencies and constraints as any other market. Following that, perhaps the best solution to deal with society's repugnance and concerns is one based upon an economic approach toward perceived moral or ethical problems. Therefore, we conduct a detailed cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the status quo (prostitution's illegality) is in fact the best policy, or whether the practice should be legalized. Currently legal in some parts of Nevada, prostitution is not federally illegal, except within some specific parameters regarding children and transportation; thus, the policy change considered is that all states legalize consensual prostitution among adults.
in order to appreciate this analysis from a purely economic perspective, prostitution must be accepted as having similar attributes and tendencies as any other transaction; personal ideologies must be set aside in order to reach objective conclusions. American society permits a myriad of activities that many citizens would not condone, including pornography, the distribution of alcohol and tobacco products (and even marijuana products, in some jurisdictions), gambling, and violent sporting events, such as boxing matches. That these activities are not prohibited, but prostitution is, seems somewhat inconsistent: all have sellers and buyers; many involve prostitution's persistent illegality. it is true that many other industries have high costs associated with negative externalities, such as certain manufacturing, which omits excessive pollution; yet, there is still a market for allowing these businesses to practice such unsavory activities. This paper now turns to prostitution's largest and most tangible costs and benefits.
Economic Costs
if prostitution were legalized, the first major cost to taxpayers would likely be the cost of regulation; this may include the cost to develop and maintain new administrative offices for the purpose of overseeing licensing and fees and sending agents to perform routine checks. Many of the costs would depend upon the degree of regulation the states decide to implement; regulations would likely vary from state to state. For purposes here, we will assume regulations would be similar to those pertaining to pornography; of all the "morally ambiguous" markets mentioned above, this is most similar to prostitution in composition and scope.
It is remarkably difficult to find state budgets for offices or agencies that regulate pornography, but the most comprehensive data come from los Angeles County, California, which recently began regulating condom usage among actors. Measure B requires that male porn actors wear condoms, and producers must obtain a permit from the los Angeles County Department of Public health in order to film sex scenes. " [T] he two-year cost of the measure would be a minimum of $582,932" (Garner 2012 ). Since, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, there are 3,141 counties (or county-equivalent governments) (U.S. Geological Survey 2013), we can figure that, if every county has some sort of permit processing office, it may cost taxpayers $915,494,706 per year to regulate prostitution [($582,932 x 3,141 counties)/2 years]. This is likely a very high estimate for several reasons and will be modified to physical contact; many pose a danger that one or more persons could be hurt in some capacity, whether physically, emotionally, or financially. However, as society generally allows for "questionably moral" or "ugly" firms, actors, sellers, and buyers to operate with some constraints, and as it generally deems that people have the right to do what they want with their property (in this case, the prostitute's body and the labor resulting therefrom), even in the face of potential negative externalities, perhaps a detailed analysis can offer some reconciliation to the benefit of all parties concerned.
The Neoclassical Model
let us stipulate that prostitution is similar in nature to other markets. Based upon the theory of bounded rationality, an integral aspect of the neoclassical model, both parties who engage in an exchange must feel that they have adequate information to make an informed and rational decision regarding whether or not to engage in the transaction. "Exchange" and "transaction" hereafter will refer to the transfer of money for sex; though, obviously, there are many variations of this scenario, including other forms of payment, e.g., drugs or protection, and various types of sexual services.
There are several problems that may arise from this exchange, particularly those dealing with asymmetric information (the prostitute knows he or she has a sexually transmitted disease (STD) while the solicitor does not), as well as transaction costs, including paying for a "pimp" or hired protection in a brothel. But, relative to any other market, there is little evidence to suggest that these exceptions are any more problematic or occur with any more frequency than the failures or shortcomings that result when one unknowingly buys a car with faulty brakes or when an establishment that serves liquor must hire "bouncers." Therefore, aside from the moral argument, there must be some good economic evidence that validates 10.4079/pp.v21i0.13347 commercialized vice (ProCon 2012 Penalties are quite varied for prostitutes, "johns," pimps, and brothel owners, and depend upon the number of previous arrests, but "[t]he average punishment for being caught patronizing a prostitute for the first time can be a fine of anywhere from $100 to $250" (Criminal law lawyer Source 2014).
We assume here that some of those arrested do not end up paying fines due to various circumstances, such as charges never being brought or because of inability to pay. We also recognize that, since fines can be upward of $100,000 for pimps and brothel owners (ProCon 2012), but most arrests are of the actual prostitutes and johns, $100 to $250 is likely an accurate range, which we will then average to $175 per arrest. This results in an expected loss of revenue due to failure to collect fines of approximately $10,966,900 per year [$175 x 62,668 arrests] .
After much consideration, we have decided that these are the two largest costs associated with legalizing prostitution. Thus begins a discussion of the more nuanced potential costs that could occur depending on how states implement the policy change.
Other Potential Costs
First (Giang 2011 ).
if we assume other states would use measures such as those enacted in Nevada, we may see a slight reduction in STDs. Nonetheless, since rates among prostitutes are already so low, it is not considered a major cost or benefit.
Also of interest was the potential increased cost to treat prostitutes' substance abuse issues and psychological trauma due to the likelihood of more prostitutes coming forward and seeking treatment. one could also argue that this cost could just as likely decrease, because prostitutes would be less likely to be physically or psychologically abused, as the whole market would become more transparent and monitored. Put simply, the inference here is that legalizing prostitution (at least in this implied sense, at regulated brothels, with treatment options for various inherent or acquired maladies) leads to prostitutes' increased willingness to seek help without fear of retribution, which also leads to prostitutes' decreased victimization and savings in the long-term because fewer prostitutes are abused or self-inflict harm. Similarly related is the benefit of the reduced cost of crimes often associated with prostitution, such as drug dealing taxpayers to set up "safe houses" or government-run brothels, much as how legalized gambling is sanctioned and run by state governments in the form of lotteries. however, these constructs are likely not within the scope of regulation and are considered only briefly, because there is no proposed legislation that suggests they would be erected. Furthermore, prostitution in Nevada is all privately owned and operated.
Additionally, regarding the possible cost to fund medical offices with personnel to administer and monitor weekly STD checks, this was assumed to have been counted in the section describing the cost of regulation, based upon figures provided by the comparison to pornography.
Also considered was the potential cost (whether borne by the state, prostitute, or brothel) to treat prostitutes with STDs; however, indications suggest that this figure would be remarkably low. In the case of the analogous pornography industry, data on STD rates in los Angeles County from the California Department of Public Health show that "[l]ess than one hiv infection per year occurs among adult film performers" (Garner 2012) . Similarly, data suggest that rates would not be significantly higher for prostitutes. Even as it is now, with prostitution mostly illegal, and thus not regulated, "[t]he U.S. Department of Health [and Human Services] consistently reports that only 3-5 percent of the sexually transmitted disease in this country is related to prostitution (compared with 30-35 percent among teenagers)" (Prostitutes' Education Network 2004).
it is worth mentioning that conversely considered, but ultimately not utilized, was the possibility of counting STD outcomes as a benefit due to the reduction of STDs resulting from better monitoring and availability of treatment. it is quite plausible that better and earlier disease identification, preventive measures, such as the enforced use of condoms, and reduced spread due to strict liability would reasonable estimate.
Another possible benefit of legalizing prostitution is the reduction of rape, as many reliable studies suggest that it would actually decrease the incidence of rape and other violence. For example, (Cundiff 2004, 2- 
3).
If we accept this figure, either because it is logical that many of those committing the rapes would seek legal outlets in the form of prostitutes, or because most of those rapes liable to cease already occur within the prostitute population due to unsafe circumstances, we should multiply this reduction by the average cost of a rape or sexual assault; this is the sum of the victim cost per incident and the criminal justice cost per incident and is valued at $142,175 (Boardman et al. 2011) . Therefore, reduction of rape would lead to a benefit to society of approximately $3,554,375,000 per year [$142,175 x 25,000 fewer rapes].
One of the largest benefits of legalizing prostitution comes in the form of increased revenue for the states, which may compensate for the loss of fines. In Nevada, "the fees [assessed by the state on legal brothels] range anywhere from $200 (lander County) to $100,000 (Storey County) per year" (Giang 2011 ). Again, we are using Nevada as the template. "Counties that have populations under 700,000 are allowed to operate licensed brothels. Currently, only eight and kidnapping, because transactions are no longer obscured by the black market, which are typically characterized by high levels of related crime.
A final consideration was the cost of the requisite increase in police presence in designated areas where prostitution occurs. however, police may also spend less time monitoring prostitution if they know where it is occurring and what law enforcement's role is.
These examples are, of course, neither exclusive nor exhaustive, but none seem to warrant extensive further investigation as they mostly occur in secondary markets and are quite difficult to quantify as directly attributable to legalizing prostitution.
Economic Benefits
Among the most appealing and indisputable benefits of legalization would be decreased arrest rates and the decreased cost to prosecute and incarcerate prostitutes, johns, pimps, and brothel owners. on the other hand, since many of these arrests result in fines rather than incarceration, one could argue that a main impetus for illegality is to raise revenue, which, as mentioned previously, could be considered a cost to the state if those fines are no longer collected. However, it appears that benefits still exceed costs, as the average cost to arrest and prosecute is about $4,324 per case (Pearl 1987) , which is obviously much more per case than the typical fine collected. When this figure is multiplied by the number of arrests per year, and the taxpayers potentially save $270,976,432 per year [$4,324 x 62,668 arrests] .
it is feasible to consider that because most arrests are not prosecuted, and because law enforcement may also consider tradeoffs and not always spend $4,324 to pursue a $175 fine, this may be an upper bound estimate of the savings. however, given that there are so many arrests that do not end in prosecution but are still costly, we feel that this is a The Nature of the original "Firm" states were to legalize prostitution, taxes from the johns alone would be approximately $80,000,000 [($3,200 ,000 x 50 states)/2 years].
it is worth noting that this assumes a similar number of visits across all states; however, Nevada accounts for only 0.88 percent of the country's total population, which is less than the expected 2 percent share if states' populations were homogeneous. Applying this, we would expect that most states would experience a greater volume of visitors, leading to more revenue, so this model may underestimate the correct figure. however, we must also consider that many of those who patronize brothels in Nevada come from other states. Under the proposed policy of nationwide legalization of prostitution, the figure used here would likely decrease. As highlighted throughout this article, it is very difficult to do any calculations regarding supply and demand or market saturation because the market only exists (legally) in one state.
Additionally, prostitutes would pay income taxes, and brothels would pay corporate taxes. Prostitutes in brothels are considered independent contractors; they therefore are not eligible for unemployment, retirement, or health benefits. They do, however, pay a federal income tax (Flowers 2011) .
Compiling data regarding how many hours prostitutes work per week has proven somewhat difficult. For example, a study from Australia found that We realize that many factors are not taken into consideration here; there may be significantly more or fewer brothels in the nation, especially when market saturation is considered, and the population makeup and tendencies of individual states may differ meaningfully. however, Nevada is the only state upon which to base estimates; furthermore, Nevada is a relatively average state with regards to other variables, such as median household and per capita incomes, population growth, median home value, and age distribution (U.S. Census Bureau 2014b).
Another increased revenue source is excise taxes. For example, in 2005 in Nevada, prostitutes in brothels "had an unlikely ally in an antiprostitution lawmaker who sponsored a measure proposing a tax of about two dollars per customer. it was expected to bring some $3.2 million to the state over the next two fiscal years" (Hennessey 2005) . Calculating that, if all 50 typically begin at $200 per 15 minutes, but can go higher," with some clients paying $2,000 per hour for a standard session, and $10,000 or more per hour for "parties" with multiple or well-known prostitutes (Flowers 2011, 44) . Dennis hof, owner of the Moonlite Bunny ranch, said his customers spend an average of $200 to $600 (vekshin 2013) . if that averages to $400 per engagement, and the typical engagement lasts under thirty minutes (Nakajima et al. 2010) , we find that clients probably do pay at least $800 per hour on average. [$400 x 2 30-minute periods in an hour]. Of course, we realize that prostitutes likely will not engage with clients for every consecutive 30-minute period, but this was accounted for in the above calculations regarding billable hours. Furthermore, this seems like a reasonable figure to use for this analysis, because prostitutes often earn much more. " [Y] ou can expect to spend anywhere from a few hundred dollars on the basic side of things to thousands of dollars and more at the other end of the spectrum" (love 2013).
it is standard practice for prostitutes to keep half of what they make, while the "house" gets the other half (vekshin 2013). Therefore, each prostitute nets $400 per hour. That is $384,000 in federally taxable income [$400 x 80 hours per month x 12 months per year], which puts him or her in the third highest income bracket, with a marginal tax rate of 33 percent and an average tax rate of about 29 percent (assuming he or she is filing individually) (Small Business Taxes & Management 2014). That is a benefit of $111,360 [$384,000 x .29] to the federal government-and therefore to US taxpayers-every year for each prostitute.
in the nineteen legal brothels in Nevada, there are hundreds of prostitutes employed at any given time. A December 2013 article reporting on Nevada prostitutes' ability to attain health insurance for the first time under the Affordable Care Act suggests that many small brothdoing three or four days of double shifts (Perkins 1991) .
ignoring the tiny fraction of prostitutes surveyed in the study who either claimed to work more than 84 hours per week or declined to offer a number, this averages out to approximately 33 hours per week.
Some of the best estimates of ranges come from a Business Insider interview with Dena, a "madam" at Sheri's ranch in Pahrump, Nevada. "Girls at the ranch work one 'tour' at a time, a contractual stay at the ranch that can last five days on the short end and up to two weeks or longer. When they're on the clock, the girls work 12-hour shifts, either 5 a.m. to 5 p.m. or vice versa" (love 2013). one prostitute, Amber lynn, splits her time evenly between being with her boyfriend in Florida and working full time at Sheri's-two weeks on, two weeks off. Finally, according to the Sheri's ranch website, " [o] ur Ladies book in for a minimum of one week up to a maximum of three weeks" (Sheri's ranch 2014).
Also complicating estimates is the possibility that billable hours per week may not be reflected in the figures mentioned above. For example, bookings (time spent actually engaged in the services provided) are likely heavily concentrated at night and on weekends, and the prostitutes may spend several hours per shift maintaining their rooms, grooming themselves, greeting patrons, negotiating fees, or attending to basic bookkeeping.
Given these statistics, we feel it is reasonable to assume that the hours for which the prostitute is paid average out to be 80 hours per month [two weeks worked (average of 1 to 3 weeks worked per month) x 40 hours per week (12-hour shifts x 5 working days per week, with four hours of each shift going to nonpaid activities)].
Though brothels' websites consistently refrain from discussing prices, the average price per hour seems to be around $800. "Prices for sexual services
Other Potential Benefits
Similar to the analysis of potential costs, there are likely several benefits that are not counted here, either because they occur in secondary markets, are too tenuous to assert, or simply have no real way of being quantified. These include the cost of lives saved by reducing murders related to prostitution and treating prostitutes' substance abuse issues. These could be measured by using the value of a statistical life; however, it would be difficult to determine correlation between legalization and the reduction of these tragedies. Equally difficult to directly attribute to legalization, because they occur in secondary and often black markets, would be the reduction of other crimes associated with prostitution.
Also worth mentioning are the potential savings for taxpayers in the form of welfare previously distributed to workers now legally employed. This may be due to the possibility that more people might be drawn to become sellers in this market and would therefore no longer require assistance, or because many people are currently registered as being eligible for welfare but are actually already working as prostitutes and bilking the system. Again, because the black market is obscured, we cannot determine how many people would enter and leave the market nor can we estimate how many claims are fraudulent. Table 1 summarizes the costs, benefits, and overall net benefits of legalizing prostitution on a national scale.
Sensitivity Analysis
As sensitivity analyses were primarily described and executed within the descriptions of each cost and benefit, and no discount rates were used, a discussion of accuracy can be brief. The most important factor is that many of the figures used are derived from a very ambiguous market, and as such, come with caveats and include rather broad ranges. Thus, the most compelling sensitivity concerns els employ around 15 prostitutes while a few large ones employ up to 500 (Gardner 2013) . Given the previous stipulation regarding prostitutes' typical on-off schedule, it is reasonable to assume that only half of a brothel's personnel may be working at any given point in time. We can also imagine that some truly small brothels (employing fewer than five prostitutes) exist without attracting media scrutiny. Therefore, we estimate the median number of prostitutes employed at a Nevada brothel to be 25, for a total of 475 statewide. Again, assuming Nevada would be on par with the average of all states (some states would have more prostitutes, some fewer), we can estimate personal income tax revenues that would be collected by the federal government at $2,644,800,000 [$111,360 x 475 prostitutes x 50 states]. In addition, since most states also utilize an income tax, combined revenues would likely be even higher.
Furthermore, with an average of twenty-five prostitutes per brothel, and the house also receiving $384,000 per prostitute per year, most brothels would face both marginal and average tax rates of 34 percent and would thus pay $3,264,000 per year [25 prostitutes per brothel x $384,000 x .34] (Small Business Taxes & Management 2014). Therefore, brothels would pay $11,564,352,000 per year in federal taxes [3,543 brothels in the country x $3,264,000 per brothel]. Combined with federal taxes paid by prostitutes, this equates to a total annual federal tax revenue increase of $14,209,152,000 [$11,564,352 ,000 from brothels + $2,644,800,000 from prostitutes]. Again, where applicable, state income taxes would increase this number. This is the figure used for purposes of this analysis. however, once again, we cannot say whether price or quantity would change if other states legalized prostitution, because we do not know how shifting from the black market would affect these outcomes. 10.4079/pp.v21i0.13347 his or her labor, namely, sexual services? This may seem impossible to quantify, but a solution may be found when we apply the Coase theorem.
We assume that the reader is somewhat familiar with Coase's seminal article "The Problem of Social Cost." From that, the Coase theorem essentially suggests that we consider compensation for the cessation of activities where both parties may have a claim to property rights. There exists a resolvable discrepancy when one party is worse off if the other exercises his or her right to use his or her property as he or she sees fit. Coase's example of a farmer and a cattle-raiser will be modified to suit the discussion here, in consideration of society's possible right to prevent prostitution and the prostitute's possible right to sell his or her services. regarding prostitution, aside from the negative consequences that affect only the parties directly engaging in the exchange, "there are the problems they are said to cause: a nose-dive in property values […] noise and litter, [and] associated crimes. Nobody seems to want visible prostitutes in their backyard" (Queen 2000) .
Though not nearly as clear as Coase's example of the cattle destroying the farmer's crops, it must be acknowledged that the prostitute's livelihood may could best be addressed by performing calculations similar to a best/worst case scenario. For example, figures such as the range of fines collected for an arrest (from $100 for a first-time offender to $100,000 for a persistent perpetrator) vary widely. For the sake of brevity, Table  2 shows the very extreme and unlikely low end of the spectrum (worst case) and very extreme and unlikely high end of the spectrum (best case) of the benefits of legalizing prostitution. As these are approximate calculations, a more indepth analysis would certainly include all the combinations of these variations and would provide a more robust analysis.
Applying the Coase Theorem to Value Social Mores and Property Rights
having shown that the monetary benefits of legalizing prostitution appear to outweigh the costs, let us turn now to the most challenging aspects of the analysis, and likely the real reasons the practice is not permitted: social mores and a poor delineation of standing in regards to property rights. To what extent does not approving of someone's behavior justify taking away their right to utilize their property as they see fit? In this case, how does one forbid another from selling window offensive (and observe the reduction in their property value), this does not necessarily mean that the developer has no right to build on his or her own property; it is not immediately clear that the person whose view is being obstructed has no rights or recourse either. one thing to note about Coase's model is that, depending on the level of regulation instated after legalization, the transaction costs might be very high or very low; it is important to Coase that they are reduced to the extent possible in order to achieve economic efficiency. in this way, perhaps the parties affected could negotiate the settlement better by determining how much the prostitute earns and how much the property value of the surrounding area is reduced thereby. if it is worth it to the prostitute to continue to engage in his or her trade after compensating the property owners, he or she will continue depend upon his or her trade and that to deny him or her that livelihood would be inflicting harm upon him or her. (Coase 1960, 2) .
Just as some would find the erection of a skyscraper in front of their Coase goes on to note that, though he believes economists and policymakers "have tended to over-estimate the advantages" of government by simply making a transaction illegal, this does no more than "suggest that government regulation should be curtailed. it does not tell us where the boundary line should be drawn" (Coase 1960, 18 
Conclusion
Though this assessment is in no way comprehensive, it is our hope and policy recommendation that the conversation regarding legalizing prostitution be revisited, if for no other reason than to consider how economic efficiency may be increased. Ultimately, the best way to deal with most potential objections seems to be to offer the rebuttal that "bad things" are occurring anyway in the illegal market. if anything, it would seem that shedding light and offering transparency would help to identify and assist the people who are most susceptible to these dangers.
As shown through this analysis, there is no reason to think that the costs of legalizing prostitution would outweigh the benefits. Though one can never anticipate all the exigent circumstances accompanying such a vast policy change, legalizing prostitution would likely not be any more fraught with insurmountable challenges and complications than was legalizing alcohol. The argument against legality seems to be one based upon personal preferences and tendencies to eschew seemingly anti-social behavior. When questioning Pigou's definition of actions that are not particularly desirable to a community, Coase states, "But he is wrong when he describes these actions as 'anti-social.' They may or may not be. it is necessary to weigh the harm against the good that will result. Nothing could be more 'anti-social' than to oppose any action which causes any harm to anyone" (Coase 1960, 35) .
sis added], that it becomes a nuisance ' (1960, 19) .
Perhaps a reasonable compromise would be to arrange a specific area where prostitutes could practice their activity, such as in the case of Nevada. Similar to the cattle-raiser paying the farmer not to grow crops on a certain tract of land, whether the community pays the prostitute not to practice his or her trade except in an agreed-upon area or the prostitute pays the community to be permitted to practice in a designated area is not of importance at this point; the key is that a complete economic analysis would indicate total allocation of resources and transaction costs. From that point, " [w] hat payment would in fact be made would depend on the shrewdness of the farmer and the cattle-raiser as bargainers" (1960, 5) .
It seems that "[t]he same levels of production are achieved whether the perpetrator of the negative externalities is legally liable for the externality costs or if [sic] the victims of the negative externalities make a payment to the perpetrator that is reduced by the amounts of the externalities" (Watkins 2014 ). Thus, assuming that the prostitute probably has some right to practice his or her trade, and, as shown by the previous calculations, it is actually more economically efficient for the transaction to be legalized, we may apply the Coase theorem in order to determine where particular costs and benefits may lie. Whether on the side of taxpayers and the government or with the prostitute, the bottom line is that monetary amounts may be counted in
